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By Cori Badgley and Nathan Jones

Estoppel is a pervasive legal concept dating back to the common law of England. Though it takes many forms, its application revolves around a party’s action or inaction to the prejudice of the other side or to a decision maker. Estoppel is a legal doctrine that may be used in certain situations to prevent a person from relying upon certain rights, or upon a set of facts (e.g. words said or actions performed) which differs from an earlier set of facts. Inquasi-judicial tribunals like the Coastal Commission, the agency may both oppose you and act in a judicial capacity. The case of Mt. Holyoke Homes, LP v. California Coastal Commission (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th illustrates that estoppel applies when a party continues to negotiate with the California Coastal Commission (“Commission”) even though the Coastal Commission has already lost jurisdiction over the disputed matter.
Continue Reading Peril for the Unwary: Use It or Lose It Against The Coastal Commission

By Leslie Walker and Nathan Jones

The following case exemplifies that a developer cannot instigate litigation attacking a proposed ordinance until a municipal government has passed the ordinance in question. The matter of Stonehouse Homes, LLC. v. City of Sierra Madre (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 531, more broadly holds that to maintain a declaratory relief action, a plaintiff must be able to demonstrate a present conflict in addition to showing the existence of tangible injury.
Continue Reading Putting The Cart Before the Horse – Developer Cannot Pursue Declaratory Judgment Before City Council Passes Final Housing Ordinance

By Leslie Z. Walker and Cori M. Badgley

California’s land use planning structure has long been governed by a philosophy of home rule. Periodically, the legislature has identified specific typical areas for state intrusion: housing policy and airport land use planning are two examples. Among other provisions, SB 375 (Chapter 728, Statutes 2008) reflects a new area of state intervention, brought on by the rising concern over global warming. This time, it is through the regional transportation planning process, with the apparent thinking that once you control the purse strings, local governments will fall into line. SB 375’s major elements are:…
Continue Reading SB 375: A Subtle Shift in the State-Local Long Range Planning Paradigm

By William W. Abbott

Sometimes, the moral of an appellate court decision is hard to find. In this case, I think it is buried in the footnotes. Many cities and counties now use administrative procedures including monetary citations as part of zoning and building code enforcement. Procedurally, a party subject of an adverse order has two avenues of appeal. First, a de novo appeal can be filed and heard by the superior court, or as illustrated in the recent case of Martin v. Riverside County Department of Code Enforcement (September 19, 2008) 2008 Cal.App.Lexis 1444, a challenge via a petition for writ of mandate serves as an alternative remedy. (Gov. Code § 53069.4(b)(1).)…
Continue Reading Zoning Citations: Next Time, Pay the Fine!

By Cori M. Badgley and Diane Kindermann

In Sunset Skyranch Pilots Association v. County of Sacramento (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 671, the Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District addressed two separate issues: 1) does the State Aeronautics Act (“SAA”) preempt the County’s decision to deny renewal of Sunset Skyranch Pilots Association (“Airport”) conditional use permit (“CUP”), and 2) does the denial of the CUP renewal constitute a “project” under the California Environmental Quality Act (“CEQA”)? The appellate court held that the SAA did not preempt the County’s decision, and denial of the renewal of the CUP did constitute a project under CEQA.
Continue Reading Court Holds that County Has Power to Deny Conditional Use Permit Renewal, but CEQA Applies

By Kate J. Hart and Janell M. Bogue

In County of Humboldt v. McKee (August 15, 2008) 2008 Cal.App.Lexis 1248, the Court of Appeal, First Appellate District examined the state’s Williamson Act. The court determined that Humboldt County (“County”) Williamson Act guidelines, adopted in 1978 (the “1978 guidelines”), governed a Williamson Act contract signed in 1977. This holding meant that the new owners, Buck Mountain Ranch Limited Partnership, and the McKee’s, (collectively “Mckee”) of Tooby Ranch, consisting of over 10,000 acres, violated the Williamson Act by dividing it into parcels of 160 acres in size. This size of parcel was allowed under the County’s previous guidelines (the “1973 guidelines”).
Continue Reading Guidelines Adopted Subsequent to Williamson Act Contract Are Enforceable

By Glen Hansen

The recent decision by the Court of Appeal for the First Appellate District in Urban Habitat Program v. City of Pleasanton (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1561, vividly illustrates the conflict that can arise between the desire by local voters to limit housing growth, the local jurisdiction’s obligations under state law to allow construction of low and moderate income housing, and the local officials’ reluctance to thwart the voters’ desire in order to meet those state obligations. That conflict invariably leads to litigation, even years after a no-growth initiative is passed by the voters.
Continue Reading Is the Local No-Growth Initiative Conflicting With The Local Low-Income Housing Obligations? When Is It Time To Sue?

By Cori Badgley

In the area of prescriptive easements, courts and practitioners have been challenged by the issue of who has the burden to prove “adverse use.” “The elements necessary to establish an easement by prescription are open and notorious use of another’s land, which use is continuous and uninterrupted for five years and adverse to the land’s owner.” Some courts have held that by providing evidence that the use is open, notorious and continuous, a presumption arises that the use is also adverse, and therefore, the defendants, and not the plaintiffs, must prove that the use is not adverse. The Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District in Grant v. Ratliff (July 16, 2008) 2008 Cal.App.Lexis 1063, disagreed with these courts.
Continue Reading Long-time Debate Over Presumptions in Prescriptive Easement Cases Settled by Second Appellate District

By Cori M. Badgley

In St. Vincent’s School for Boys v. City of San Rafael (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 989, the court addressed various issues relating to the City of San Rafael’s (“City”) approval of a new general plan. The court also addressed a claim brought by the City against St. Vincent’s School for Boys (“St. Vincent’s”) regarding obtaining reasonable costs for record preparation.
Continue Reading Unwanted, Now Unplanned: City Says “No” to Annexation and Draws the Line on City Expansion

By Leslie Z. Walker

In Muzzy Ranch Co. v. Solano County Land Use Commission (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1, decided on June 19, 2008, the appellate court resolved the issues not addressed the first time it reviewed the case. (Muzzy Ranch Co. v. Solano County Airport Land Use Commission (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 810, reversed by Muzzy Ranch Co. v. Solano County Airport Land Use Commission, (2007) 41 Cal.4th 372.) In this case, the Court of Appeal for the First Appellate District found that the Travis Airport Land Use Compatibility Plan (“TALUP”) was not inconsistent with the Air Force Installation Compatible Use Zone (“AICUZ”) and that the Solano County Airport Land Use Commission (“Commission”) did not abuse its discretion in adopting the TALUP.
Continue Reading The Rest of Muzzy Ranch: ALUCs Not Required to Adopt AICUZ Standards