On July 29, 2025, the California Court of Appeal issued a final ruling in Sheetz vs. El Dorado County in favor of the County on an unconstitutional takings claim. The decision, which followed a remand from the United States Supreme Court, addresses the requirements of federal constitutional law that applies to jurisdictions across the country.

Abbott & Kindermann, Inc., represented the County in this decisive win for reasonable development impact fees that are based on well-supported and generally-applied fee schedules for different kinds of development.  In a subsequent post, we will explain the holding and reasoning of the Court of Appeal’s decision.  The court’s analysis is instructive as to how impact fees can be developed and structured to comply with both the United States Constitution and California’s Mitigation Fee Act.

Along with representing litigants in such cases, Abbott & Kindermann provides guidance for local agencies in creating, amending and implementing such fee programs.

Diane G. Kindermann (2015-2025) and William W. Abbott (2004-2025) were again selected for the Northern California Super Lawyers List in the practice areas of Land Use and Zoning law. More information is available here.

Abbott & Kindermann, Inc. has been serving private and public clients in California on land use, environmental, and real estate matters for more than 30 years.

For questions relating to this article or any other California land use, real estate, environmental and/or planning issues contact Diane Kindermann, Bill Abbott and Glen Hansen at Abbott & Kindermann, Inc. at (916) 456–9595.

The information presented in this article should not be construed to be formal legal advice by Abbott & Kindermann, Inc., or the formation of a lawyer/client relationship. Because of the changing nature of this area of the law and the importance of individual facts, readers are encouraged to seek independent counsel for advice regarding their individual legal issues.

Abbott & Kindermann, Inc., is proud to announce that Best Lawyers® has once again selected Abbott & Kindermann for top rankings in the areas of Land Use, Zoning Law and Litigation for 2025. More information is available at Best Lawyers® Best Law Firms.

Abbott & Kindermann has been serving private and public clients in California on land use, environmental, and real estate matters for more than 30 years. Representative matters include:

Advisory Services:

  • Due diligence, entitlements, and real estate services for commercial, industrial, orchard, vineyard, renewable energy, and mining properties;
  • Advise, defend, and settle regulatory compliance matters including the Clean Water Act, Porter-Cologne, air quality, Subdivision Map Act and local zoning;
  • Create and update land use entitlement strategies by evaluating permissible uses on properties throughout the state;
  • CEQA compliance for new construction and redevelopment projects;
  • Advise and defend AB 1600 Mitigation Fee Act compliance for public agencies and private clients;
  • Expert witness work in land use disputes; and
  • Advise, review, and defend environmental documents and land use entitlements for development.

Litigation Services In The United States Supreme Court, Federal and State Courts:

  • CEQA;
  • General Plans and Zoning;
  • Clean Water Act;
  • Easements, implied and express dedications;
  • Covenants, conditions, and restrictions;
  • Land use entitlements;
  • Eminent domain and inverse condemnation;
  • Board of Supervisors or City Council land use approvals;
  • AB 1600 Mitigation Fee Act;
  • Subdivision Map Act;
  • Land use construction defect; and
  • California tribal consultation.

For questions relating to this article or any other California land use, real estate, environmental and/or planning issues contact Diane Kindermann, Bill Abbott, or Glen Hansen at Abbott & Kindermann, Inc. at (916) 456-9595.

The information presented in this article should not be construed to be formal legal advice by Abbott & Kindermann, Inc., or the formation of a lawyer/client relationship. Because of the changing nature of this area of the law and the importance of individual facts, readers are encouraged to seek independent counsel for advice regarding their individual legal issues.

Juliana v. United States, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71759, 2024 WL 1695064 (D. Or., Apr. 19, 2024)

In an order directing a lower court to dismiss without leave to amend, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ended decade-long legal battle of Juliana v. United States. The saga began in 2015 in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon when a group of young citizens sued the United States along with various government officials and agencies. The plaintiffs’ claims stemmed from the government’s knowledge of, and failure to take actions to prevent, the impact of fossil fuels and carbon dioxide on the environment. The plaintiffs asserted that a number of their constitutional rights were violated, and that the government had violated the public trust doctrine. They asked the court to require the government to develop and implement a national plan to phase out fossil fuel emissions and decrease atmospheric carbon dioxide.

In 2020 the case made its way to the Ninth Circuit via interlocutory appeal. Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir, 2020). The court noted the plaintiffs had compiled an extensive record making it difficult to deny the increasingly rapid rate at which climate change is occurring, and the federal government’s knowledge of and contribution to the issue through both action and inaction. Despite this, the appellate court explained that for the case to proceed the plaintiffs’ claims needed Article III standing, requiring a showing that the plaintiffs suffered an injury as a result of the challenged conduct, and that the injury is redressable by a favorable judicial decision. Though the plaintiffs successfully showed the required injury and causation, at least in so far as to withstand summary judgment, the court concluded the plaintiffs could not meet the redressability burden. The Ninth Circuit explained that any plan which would grant the relief sought would necessarily implicate a host of complex policy decisions entrusted to the executive and legislative branches. The court “reluctantly conclude[d]…that the plaintiffs’ case must be made to the political branches or to the electorate at large,” and remanded the case to the District Court with instruction to dismiss for lack of Article III standing. Juliana,947 F.3d at 1175.

Following the Ninth Circuit’s decision, the District Court granted the plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint. The district court believed it was not barred from granting leave to amend, despite the “rule of mandate” which requires that a lower court unquestioningly execute the terms of a mandate, because (1) the Ninth Circuit had not “expressly state[d] the plaintiffs could not amend to replead their case,” and (2) intervening law, in the form of Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski, 592 U.S. 279 (2021), established that partial declaratory relief satisfies redressability for purposes of Article III standing, allowing the plaintiffs’ amended complaint to potentially satisfy the redressability requirement. Juliana v. United States, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95411 at p.17.

In response to the amended complaint, the government petitioned the Ninth Circuit for mandamus to enforce their earlier mandate. The Ninth Circuit granted the petition on May 1, 2024, and issued an order the same day. The court explained that its previous mandate was to dismiss, and that “neither the mandate’s letter nor its spirit left room for amendment.” Though the court acknowledged that when a subsequently decided case changes the law a District Court is not bound by a mandate, Uzuegbunam did not represent such a change. The court then reiterated the requirement that the case be dismissed, making it expressly clear that this time the dismissal would be “without leave to amend.” On July 12, 2024, the Ninth Circuit denied the plaintiffs’ motion for rehearing or reconsideration en banc of the court’s May 2024 order and directed the federal district court for the District of Oregon to dismiss the case.

Mat dos Santos, co-executive director of Our Children’s Trust, an Oregon-based law firm that represents the plaintiffs, maintains that “we’re…going to argue that it was wrongly decided.” Though it is possible for the plaintiffs to seek a rehearing en banc before the Ninth Circuit, or appeal to the Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit’s order likely brings the long saga of Juliana v. United States to an end. So far, no update about the case, and it stays denied by Juliana v. United States, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71759, 2024 WL 1695064 (D. Or., Apr. 19, 2024).

Glen Hansen is Senior Counsel, and Simyllina Chen is a Law Clerk at Abbott & Kindermann, Inc.  For questions relating to this article or any other California land use, real estate, environmental and/or planning issues contact Abbott & Kindermann, Inc. at (916) 456-9595.

The information presented in this article should not be construed to be formal legal advice by Abbott & Kindermann, Inc., or the formation of a lawyer/client relationship. Because of the changing nature of this area of the law and the importance of individual facts, readers are encouraged to seek independent counsel for advice regarding their individual legal issues.

SEC v. Jarkesy, 603 U.S. 109 (2024)

In SEC v. Jarkesy, 603 U.S. 109 (2024), the United States Supreme Court held that it is a violation of the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial for the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) to bring enforcement actions against parties for securities violations in in-house administrative proceedings.

Congress enacted the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (“the Antifraud Provisions”) to combat securities fraud and increase market transparency. The SEC is charged with enforcing the provisions and can bring enforcement actions either (1) in federal court, where a jury finds the facts, and an Article III judge presides; or (2) in-house, where there are no juries, and either the SEC or an Administrative Law Judge finds the facts and adjudicates the matter.

Following an in-house enforcement action the SEC determined that George Jarkesy, Jr., and his firm, Patriot28, LLC, had violated the antitrust provisions, and levied a penalty of $300,000. Jarkesy and Patriot28 petitioned for judicial review, whereupon the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal held that adjudicating the matter in-house violated the defendants’ Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. The United States Supreme Court subsequently granted the SEC’s petition for certiorari.

The Majority Held that the SEC Adjudicating the Matter In-House Violated the Seventh Amendment Right to a Jury

a) The Seventh Amendment is Implicated When Suits are Legal in Nature

The Court held that the Seventh Amendment “embrace[s] all suits which are not of equity or admiralty jurisdiction.” The majority explained that this means statutory claims which are “legal in nature” implicate the Seventh Amendment. To determine whether an action is legal in nature, the majority, relying on Tull v. United States ,481 U.S. 412 (1987), explained that a court must consider “whether the cause of action resembles common law causes of action, and whether the remedy is the sort that was traditionally obtained in a court of law.” Of these two factors, the majority believed the remedy is the more important, and, in this case, was all but dispositive.

The SEC sought civil penalties, which are a form of monetary relief. According to the majority, such relief is legal in nature when it is designed to “punish or deter the wrongdoer rather than solely to ‘restore the status quo.’” The majority concluded the penalties go beyond restoring the status quo, and are “a type of remedy…that could only be enforced in courts of law,” because (1) the Antifraud Provisions condition the availability and size of civil penalties on considerations including culpability, deterrence, and recidivism; (2) the SEC is not obligated to use the penalties to compensate victims; and (3) the SEC is allowed to collect penalties even when no one is injured.

Also, the majority found that, though federal securities fraud and common law fraud are not identical, they are similar enough that federal securities fraud “resembles [a] common law cause[] of action,” confirming the action is “legal in nature.”

b) If a Claim Implicates the Seventh Amendment, a Jury Trial is Required Unless the “Public Rights” Exception Applies

Under the “public rights” exception, Congress may properly assign certain matters for decision to an agency without a jury trial. The SEC, relying on Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm’n, 430 U.S. 442 (1977), argued that the public rights exception applied here because (1) Congress created “new statutory obligations, impose[d] civil penalties for their violation, and then commit[ted] to an administrative agency the function of deciding whether a violation ha[d] in fact occurred”; and (2) the Government was the party bringing the action. But the majority held Atlas Roofing inapplicable because the claim in that case was not akin to a common law claim. The majority clarified that, per Tull, the Seventh Amendment applies to novel statutory claims so long as they are akin to common law claims. The public rights exception does not “apply automatically whenever Congress assigns a matter to an agency for adjudication.”

Relying on Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg ,492 U.S. 33 (1989), the majority further explained that what matters “is the substance of the suit, not where it is brought, who brings it, or how it is labeled.” Congress may not “withdraw from judicial cognizance any matter which, from its nature, is the subject of a suit at common law.” If a suit is in the nature of an action at common law, the matter presumptively concerns private rights, and adjudication by an Article III court is mandatory, regardless of whether the Government is a party. Here, the antifraud provisions target the same basic conduct as common law fraud, operate pursuant to the same basic legal principles, and provide for civil penalties. In the majority’s view, this means the action in question involves private, rather than public, rights. The fact that Congress had statutorily created the cause of action, and the fact that the Government was a party to the suit, did not change the type of right implicated, and so the public rights doctrine did not obviate the need for a jury.

The Dissent, Asserted That the Public Rights Doctrine is Much Broader Than the Majority Believes

In dissent, Justice Sotomayor (joined by Justices Kagan and Justice Jackson) agreed that a Seventh Amendment challenge was at issue. They explained that the Seventh Amendment question only arises after addressing a threshold Article III question. Per the dissent, if an action is properly in a non-Article III forum, then the Seventh Amendment does not apply.

The dissent treats the public rights doctrine not as an exception to the Seventh Amendment, but rather the first step in answering the Article III question. If a cause of action involves a public right, then it need not be adjudicated in an Article III court. Relying on Granfinanciera, the dissent explained that (1) if Congress enacts a statutory cause of action that “inheres in, or lies against, the Federal Government in its sovereign capacity” then it is a public right; and (2) if a case involves a dispute “to which the Federal Government is not a party in its sovereign capacity” (i.e. a case between two private parties) then it is a public right if “Congress…has created a seemingly ‘private’ right that is so closely integrated into a public regulatory scheme as to be a matter appropriate for agency resolution.” Because the government was a party and sought to enforce rights for the benefit of the public, the dissent believed the public rights doctrine clearly applied here.

Also, the dissent criticized the majority’s reliance on Granfinanciera. According to the dissent, Granfinanciera is distinguishable because the action there was between two private parties. Because the government was not a party the dissent believed Granfinanciera is only relevant when addressing the second type of public right outlined above.

In addition, the dissent took issue with the majority’s reliance on Tull for the proposition that the remedy is nearly dispositive of the issue. The dissent distinguished Tull because it took place in a federal district court. According to the dissent, once a case is in an Article III court, the Seventh Amendment analysis outlined by the majority kicks in, but that analysis is inapplicable to determining whether a case need be in an Article III court.

The dissent further agreed that, contrary to the majority’s assertion, the dissent believed the statutory scheme in Atlas Roofing involved civil penalties and resembled the common-law torts of negligence and wrongful death as closely as the antifraud provisions resemble common-law fraud. Because it did not find Atlas Roofing to be distinguishable and found that neither the rule established in Tull nor Granfinanciera apply to a dispute wherein the Government is a party, and in which the dispute is adjudicated in a non-Article III forum, the dissent argued that Atlas Roofing easily settled this case. In the dissent’s opinion Congress acted within its power to create a new statutory scheme, and to allow the SEC to enforce that scheme in-house. Because the dissent found no Article III issue, the Seventh Amendment was not implicated.

Conclusion and Broader Application

There are more than two dozen agencies that can impose civil penalties in administrative proceedings. Though some of those agencies, such as the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the SEC, are authorized to pursue civil penalties in both administrative proceedings and federal court, many others, such as the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission, and the Department of Agriculture, are only authorized to bring enforcement of civil penalties in in-house proceedings. For those that are authorized to do both, the holding in this case may require enforcement actions to be pursued in federal court, which would likely increase the cost of such actions, and reduce consistency as to their outcomes. For those that are required to utilize in-house proceedings, this holding may prove more troublesome still, as the constitutionality of hundreds of statutes may now be in question. Per the words of the dissent, for those agencies “all the majority can say is tough luck; get a new statute from Congress.”

Glen Hansen is Senior Counsel, and Simyllina Chen is a Law Clerk at Abbott & Kindermann, Inc.  For questions relating to this article or any other California land use, real estate, environmental and/or planning issues contact Abbott & Kindermann, Inc. at (916) 456-9595.

The information presented in this article should not be construed to be formal legal advice by Abbott & Kindermann, Inc., or the formation of a lawyer/client relationship. Because of the changing nature of this area of the law and the importance of individual facts, readers are encouraged to seek independent counsel for advice regarding their individual legal issues.

Friends of Gualala River v. Gualala Redwood Timber_ LLC_2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 24618

In Friends of Gualala River v. Gualala Redwood Timber, LLC, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 24618, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Appellants’ action under 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g), concluding Appellants’ claim under the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) is moot.

Plaintiffs-Appellants Friends of Gualala River (“FOGR”) and the Center for Biological Diversity (“CBD”) (collectively, “Appellants”) sued Defendant-Appellee Gualala Redwood Timber, LLC (“GT”) for violating the ESA by logging the Gualala River floodplain and “taking” several endangered species, under the citizen suit provisions of the ESA.

The underlying suit was dismissed in 2020 when FOGR and CBD jointly filed the case in the Northern District of California federal court to challenge GT’s logging plan that the plan allegedly would result in the “taking” of protected species through habitat modification and degradation. Appellants brought their claims on Section 9 of the ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1538, which makes it unlawful to “take” any species listed as threatened or endangered. To “take” means to “harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or attempt to engage in such conduct.” 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19). The district court concluded that Plaintiffs did not meet the threshold inquiry for injunctive relief that they had demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits because a final judgment had already been issued by a California state court on the same claim and principles of res judicata would bar them from relitigating the same cause of action as a prior case in the federal court. Therefore, the district court denied the preliminary injunction in August 2021.

On September 30, 2924, the Ninth Circuit determined that Appellants’ claim of illegal “taking” of several endangered species by GT was moot, reasoning that “[a]ppellants brought their suit under section 9, not section 7. Section 9 does not authorize the Court to impose mitigation measures on a private party in an ESA case. Rather, it allows only injunctive relief, which Appellants failed to receive in the district court and have not appealed here.” Therefore, there was no effective remedy available.

Glen Hansen is Senior Counsel and Simyllina Chen is a Law Clerk at Abbott & Kindermann, Inc.  For questions relating to this article or any other California land use, real estate, environmental and/or planning issues contact Abbott & Kindermann, Inc. at (916) 456-9595.

The information presented in this article should not be construed to be formal legal advice by Abbott & Kindermann, Inc., or the formation of a lawyer/client relationship. Because of the changing nature of this area of the law and the importance of individual facts, readers are encouraged to seek independent counsel for advice regarding their individual legal issues.

Puget Soundkeeper Alliance v. Port of Tacoma, 104 F.4th 95 (9th Cir. 2024).

Puget Soundkeeper Alliance (“Puget”) is an environmental organization concerned with water quality in Puget Sound. It brought a citizen suit under the Clean Water Act (“CWA”) against the Port of Tacoma, alleging that the Port had violated the Act in various respects. The marine cargo terminal contains a portion of the terminal where five large cranes load and unload container ships, commonly referred to as “the Wharf.” When rain falls on the terminal, stormwater runs into Puget Sound, carrying with it metals and other pollutants. The district court granted partial summary judgment to the Port, holding that the Industrial Stormwater General Permit (“ISGP”) does not extend coverage to the entire footprint of facilities but only to the parts “associated with industrial activity.” Because such activities do not occur at the Wharf, discharges from there do not require permits.

The Ninth Circuit vacated and reversed in part the district court’s partial summary judgment in favor of the Port and held that the plain text of the ISGPs required “a transportation facility conducting industrial activities implement stormwater controls across the entire facility.” Because the terminal was a facility conducting industrial activities, the permits extended CWA discharge requirements to all discharges from the whole facility, including the Wharf. The panel further reasoned that “the nature of the facility, not the nature of the discharge, determines whether there is coverage.”

Separately, the Port of Tacoma challenged the 2020 ISGP before the Washington State Pollution Control Hearings Board. The Washington Court of Appeals reviewed the board’s decision and issued a decision in accordance with the one from the Ninth Circuit. The port’s appeal is pending before the Washington Supreme Court.

Glen Hansen is Senior Counsel and Simyllina Chen is a Law Clerk at Abbott & Kindermann, Inc.  For questions relating to this article or any other California land use, real estate, environmental and/or planning issues contact Abbott & Kindermann, Inc. at (916) 456-9595.

The information presented in this article should not be construed to be formal legal advice by Abbott & Kindermann, Inc., or the formation of a lawyer/client relationship. Because of the changing nature of this area of the law and the importance of individual facts, readers are encouraged to seek independent counsel for advice regarding their individual legal issues.

In 2023 the California Department of Water Resources (“DWR”) deemed Groundwater Sustainability Plans (“GSPs”) for six groundwater basins inadequate, triggering state intervention. The six subbasins are: Chowchilla Subbasin, Delta-Mendota Subbasin, Kaweah Subbasin, Tule Subbasin, Tulare Lake Subbasin, and Kern Subbasin. When DWR deems a GSP inadequate for a basin, oversight of the basin transfers from the local Groundwater Sustainability Agency (“GSA”) to the State Water Resources Control Board (“SWRCB”), who holds a public hearing to determine whether the basin should be placed on probationary status.

On April 16, 2024, at a Public Board Hearing for the first of the six subbasins, the SWRCB designated the Tulare Lake Subbasin as probationary. The decision marks the first time a groundwater basin has been designated as probationary. Under that decision, starting July 15, 2024, well users who extract more than two acre-feet of groundwater per year will be required to track their groundwater use, and submit annual groundwater extraction reports by December 1, 2024 and by December 1 for every subsequent portion of the water year that the basin is probationary. If, after a year the deficiencies have not been addressed, the SWRCB could move into the next phase of the state intervention process, called an interim plan, under which the SWRCB could impose pumping restrictions on basins, or issue fines for exceeding water allotments. However, these reporting requirements have been temporarily suspended as of July 15, 2024 due to ongoing litigation, although groundwater extractors are responsible for staying up to date regarding fee payments.

The Kings County Farm Bureau, joined by two landowners, filed a lawsuit on May 15, 2024, in response to the designation. The lawsuit alleges that the SWRCB’s decision is “an act of State overreach that exceeds the Board’s authority under [the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act] and will devastate the Tulare Lake Subbasins and the Kings County economy.” The lawsuit asks for declaratory and injunctive relief.

Original hearings to consider designation of the Tule Subbasin and the Kaweah Subbasin were scheduled for September 17, 2024, and November 5, 2024, respectively. But the state postponed the Kaweah groundwater region’s probationary hearing until January 7, 2025, according to an announcement at a “state of the subbasin” event held June 19, 2024 to answer questions about what probation would mean. The hearing for Kern County Groundwater Subbasin on probationary status is scheduled for February 20, 2025. Hearings for the remaining two subbasins have yet to be scheduled.

Glen Hansen is Senior Counsel and Simyllina Chen is a Law Clerk at Abbott & Kindermann, Inc.  For questions relating to this article or any other California land use, real estate, environmental and/or planning issues contact Abbott & Kindermann, Inc. at (916) 456-9595.

The information presented in this article should not be construed to be formal legal advice by Abbott & Kindermann, Inc., or the formation of a lawyer/client relationship. Because of the changing nature of this area of the law and the importance of individual facts, readers are encouraged to seek independent counsel for advice regarding their individual legal issues.

Reserve your seat for our annual conference taking place in March of 2024 for our in-person and virtual conferences.

On March 14, 2024, Abbott & Kindermann, Inc. will present its 23rd annual In-Person Conference. March 28-29, 2024 Abbott & Kindermann, Inc. will present its 23rd annual Virtual Conferences. All Conferences are for clients and colleagues interested in current land use, environmental, and real estate issues affecting commercial and residential development, agriculture, real estate transactions, easements, mining and the construction materials production industry.

A summary of 2023 case law and legislative updates includes the following hot topics:

  • CALIFORNIA WATER RIGHTS AND SUPPLY
  • WATER QUALITY
  • WETLANDS
  • AIR QUALITY
  • CLIMATE CHANGE & RENEWABLE ENERGY
  • ENDANGERED SPECIES
  • HAZARDOUS MATERIALS & REMEDIATION
  • NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT (“NEPA”)
  • MINING, OIL AND GAS
  • STREAMBED ALTERATION AGREEMENTS
  • FOREST RESOURCES
  • CULTURAL RESOURCES PROTECTION
  • ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT
  • GENERAL REAL ESTATE
  • COMMON INTEREST DEVELOPMENTS
  • REAL ESTATE CONTRACTS & TRANSACTIONS
  • EASEMENTS, ADVERSE POSSESSION, DEDICATIONS, & BOUNDARY DISPUTES
  • FEES, TAKINGS, AND EXACTIONS
  • CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY ACT (“CEQA”)
  • PLANNING, DEVELOPMENT AND THE SUBDIVISION MAP ACT
  • LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION

Details for the In-Person and Virtual Conferences will come out shortly.  We hope you can join us and we look forward to seeing you there.

Reserve your seat for our annual conference taking place in March of 2024 for our In-Person and Virtual Conferences.

On March 14, 2024, Abbott & Kindermann, Inc. will present its 23rd annual In-Person Conference. March 28th or 29th, 2024 Abbott & Kindermann, Inc. will present its 23rd annual Virtual Conferences. All Conferences are for clients and colleagues interested in current land use, environmental, and real estate issues affecting commercial and residential development, agriculture, real estate transactions, easements, mining and the construction materials production industry.

A summary of 2023 case law and legislative updates includes the following hot topics:

  • CALIFORNIA WATER RIGHTS AND SUPPLY
  • WATER QUALITY
  • WETLANDS
  • AIR QUALITY & CLIMATE CHANGE
  • RENEWABLE ENERGY
  • ENDANGERED SPECIES
  • HAZARDOUS MATERIALS & REMEDIATION
  • NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT (“NEPA”)
  • MINING, OIL AND GAS
  • STREAMBED ALTERATION AGREEMENTS
  • FOREST RESOURCES
  • CULTURAL RESOURCES PROTECTION
  • ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT
  • GENERAL REAL ESTATE
  • COMMON INTEREST DEVELOPMENTS
  • REAL ESTATE CONTRACTS & TRANSACTIONS
  • EASEMENTS, ADVERSE POSSESSION, DEDICATIONS, & BOUNDARY DISPUTES
  • FEES, TAKINGS, AND EXACTIONS
  • CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY ACT (“CEQA”)
  • PLANNING, DEVELOPMENT AND THE SUBDIVISION MAP ACT
  • LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION

Abbott & Kindermann, Inc. will present its annual program virtually and in-person with a mix of conveniently available pre-recorded content and a live session component. 

Registration Information:

  • Registration fee is $110.00 for In-Person Conference
    • Location of In-Person Conference: Hilton Sacramento Arden West
  • Registration fee is $55.00 for Virtual Events
  • Register for the date of the In-Person and Virtual Event you would like to attend by clicking the following links:
    • March 14, 2024 (In-Person):
    • March 28th or 29th, 2024 (Virtual):

Please register early to reserve your spot. MCLE and AICP CM credits are available. We hope you can join us and we look forward to engaging with you soon.

Please call (916) 456-9595 with any questions.