According to the appellate court in this case, “an individual medical marijuana patient is not the proper party to challenge generally applicable zoning provisions because – whatever the contours of the right to engage in cooperate or collective medical marijuana activity (see e.g., § 11362.775) – the Legislature invested this right in cooperative and collective groups and entities, not individuals.” Therefore, the plaintiff had no standing to bring an action against the city.
Continue Reading No Matter How Compelling a Story, a Medical Marijuana Patient Lacks Standing to Sue City

What happens when a city fails to comply with the provisions of its charter and zoning code and fails to make the proper findings under the Topanga case in granting a conditional use permit and variance? The city has to rehear the matter and make the proper findings based on substantial evidence before it.
Continue Reading Failure Of City To Comply With Its Charter, Zoning Code and the Topanga Case, Requires Reconsideration And Proper Findings For Use Permit And Variances

Under Public Resources Code section 30603, subdivision (a)(4), the California Coastal Commission has appellate jurisdiction over a project within the coastal zone that needs subdivision approval, even if the project involves the construction of a principal permitted use under the local coastal plan.
Continue Reading Coastal Commission Has Appellate Jurisdiction Over A Project That Needs Subdivision Approval, Even If The Project’s Use Complies With The Local Coastal Plan

In the case of South Orange County Wastewater Authority v. City of Dana Point (2011) 196 Cal. App. 4th 1604 (“South Orange”), the Court of Appeal for the Fourth Appellate District was asked to order an environmental impact report (EIR) be prepared to assess the impact of the environment on a proposed project pursuant to the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). The court of appeal declined to order such an EIR. The court of appeal also addressed whether the adopted project was inconsistent with the city’s general plan and zoning ordinance, and found that the project was consistent.
Continue Reading Adjacent Landowners Can’t Use CEQA to Avoid Potential Nuisance Claims

In Arcadia Development Co. v. City of Morgan Hill (August 5, 2011, H035519) ___ Cal.App.4th ___, the city did not spot zone Arcadia’s property and did not violate Arcadia’s equal protection rights by placing a measure on the ballot which amended the city’s zoning code to prohibit extensive development on Arcadia’s property.
Continue Reading Growth Measure Survives Spot Zoning and Equal Protection Challenge in an “As Applied” Challenge

By now, most CEQA practitioners have faced the problem of what to do when a project opponent submits the Attorney General’s 18-page list of potential greenhouse gas mitigation measures, suggesting the measures might be appropriate for the project at issue. On June 30, 2011, the Court of Appeal for the Second Appellate District held that the lead agency is not necessarily required to explain why each of the proposed measures is inappropriate for the specific project.
Continue Reading Lead Agencies Are Not Always Required to Explain Why Every Proposed Mitigation Measure is Infeasible

The Court of Appeal for the Fourth Appellate District found substantial evidence of a fair argument that a Target development project would have a significant environmental impact by disturbing contaminated soil, but rejected challenges based on air pollution and greenhouse gas impacts.
Continue Reading Implicit Approval of Using AB 32 Reduction Goals to Establish GHG Thresholds

Please join William W. Abbott and Steven Rudolph on August 18, 2011 from 9:00 AM to 4:30 PM for an in depth look at the art of crafting development agreements in their UC Davis Extension course, Vested Rights, Vesting Maps and Development Agreements.
Continue Reading Vested Rights Class at UC Davis Extension August 18, 2011

By Cori M. Badgley

The court in Chawanakee Unified School District v. County of Madera (2011, No. F059382) ____ Cal.App.4th ____ faced the difficult task of interpreting an amendment to the School Facilities Act and how it interacts with CEQA as an issue of first impression. The specific provision at issue restricts the “methods of considering and mitigating impacts on school facilities” to the fees provided in the School Facilities Act. (Gov. Code, § 65996(a).) The court held that although this provision obviated the need to discuss direct impacts on school facilities in the CEQA document, the provision did not apply to indirect impacts, such as traffic or construction.Continue Reading The Devil is in the Details… At Least When it Comes to Interpreting the School Facilities Act