By William W. Abbott

El Dorado Estates v. City of Fillmore,765 F.3d 1118(9th Cir. Cal.2014)

The Ninth Circuit has concluded that the improper handling of a subdivision application by a city can give rise to a claim of discrimination under the Fair Housing Act. The claim stems from city responses to an application to subdivide an existing mobilehome park. El Dorado Estates (“El Dorado”) is the owner of a mobilehome park for residents 55 and older, located in the City of Fillmore. In 2008, the city considered adopting a park rent control ordinance, and El Dorado publically discussed the opening of the park to families. El Dorado elected to pursue a different path, that being to exit as a park operator and to subdivide and sell the tenant spaces. The existing tenants were opposed, and El Dorado encountered obstacles in processing its subdivision application through the city. El Dorado sued the city twice in state court. El Dorado then filed in federal court, alleging that the city’s land use practices were discriminatory based upon family status (families with minor children). El Dorado alleged that it faced unreasonable delays and expenses as a result of the city’s allegedly discriminatory practices. The city successfully filed a motion to dismiss based upon El Dorado’s lack of standing. The district court agreed, dismissing the case, and El Dorado appealed.

The Ninth Circuit disagreed, finding that El Dorado met the minimum three elements to satisfy standing: injury in fact, causation and redressibility. The Ninth held that that El Dorado alleged sufficient injury: unreasonable delays and extralegal conditions imposed upon its land use requests. Satisfied with the allegations of injury, the court of appeals found the remaining two elements: causation could be linked back to the allegations pertaining to the city’s actions while processing the applications and redressibility in that the district could award monetary damages based upon the injuries suffered by El Dorado. Whether El Dorado can prove its claims at trial remains to be determined. More on the federal Fair Housing Act can be found here http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/hce/title8.php. Information concerning California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act can be viewed here http://www.dfeh.ca.gov/Publications_FEHADescr.htm.Continue Reading Local Land Use Permitting and Discrimination Under the Fair Housing Act

By William W. Abbott

Foothill Communities Coalition v. County of Orange (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1302. In the minds of most local planners, spot zoning is typically associated with downzoning of a smaller parcel in circumstances in which the surrounding property is similar in character, but which retains a more intensive zoning designation. From the perspective of the California’s Fourth Appellate District, a rezoning which creates the converse result (that is the donut hole being rezoned to a more intensive classification) can also trigger a claim of spot zoning. In the facts of Foothill Communities Coalition v. County of Orange, the trial court invalidated the rezoning. On appeal however, the appellate court found the rezoning to be a valid exercise of the police power and upheld the rezoning.Continue Reading Up Zoning Creating Special Benefits Can Trigger Spot Zoning Claims

By William W. Abbott

Eskeland v. City of Del Mar (February 19, 2014) ___Cal.App.4th.___. While most land use debates involve projects of physical substance, even the single family home is capable of generating appellate opinions. The most recent case involves a grant, by the City of Del Mar, of a variance from a front yard setback requirement. The variance was granted so that the owners could construct a new single family home in the footprint of the existing single family home. The history suggested that the existing home was constructed before the current setback standard was adopted. The owner proposed to reconstruct in the same footprint, but would expand the footprint parallel to the front property line. As a result, there would be a linear expansion of the building including new additional square footage to be built within the setback restriction, but no additional perpendicular intrusion into the front yard setback area. The building lot included areas with a 25% slope, and buildable area was limited.Continue Reading Steep Lot Justified Grant Of A Variance For The Replacement Single Family Home

By Glen Hansen

In Tuthill v. City of San Buenaventura (2014) ___ Cal.App.4th ___, the Court of Appeal for the Second Appellate District held that a trial court could not apply equitable principles to circumvent the statutory scheme of public entity immunity embodied in Government Code section 815 et seq, in order to award damages against a city based on the city’s failure to disclose affordable housing restrictions that applied to plaintiffs’ townhomes.Continue Reading Even If The Policies Behind Affordable Housing Are Thwarted, A Court May Not Use “Equitable Principles” To Avoid Public Entity Immunity In The Tort Claims Act.

By Katherine J. Hart

In San Diego Citizenry Group v. County of San Diego (Published August 26, 2013, D059962) ___ Cal.App.4th ___, the Court of Appeal, Fourth District, upheld San Diego County’s (County) certification of an EIR and approval of a Tiered Winery Ordinance Amendment (Winery Ordinance) which permits boutique wineries in agriculturally designated and zoned land in the unincorporated area of the County by right. In ruling on a dispute regarding the cost of transcripts in the administrative record, the Fourth Appellate District reversed the trial court and held appellant was not required to reimburse the County for the costs of transcribing transcripts of the planning commission meetings pursuant to Public Resources Code section 21167.6(e)(4).Continue Reading Transcripts Not Always Required For Administrative Record

By William W. Abbott

As developers pursue infill or re-use opportunities, a predictable question regarding impact fees will arise: To what extent is the developer entitled to a credit for the existing uses onsite which ultimately are displaced by a new project? At least in the case of school facilities, we know from the recent decision in Cresta Bella, LP v. Poway Unified School District (July 31, 2013, D060789) ___ Cal.App.4th ___,that the burden is on the agency to justify the fee, and in the absence of sufficient justification, that the developer may be entitled to a fee refund. Continue Reading School District Failed to Document Justification For Applying Full School Fees to Demolition of and Development of a Multi-family Project

By Glen C. Hansen

In Lockaway Storage v. County of Alameda (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 161, the Court of Appeal for the First Appellate District affirmed a trial court judgment that found that the County of Alameda was liable for $989,640.96 in damages for a temporary taking of plaintiff’s property, where the county stopped work on plaintiff’s project in light of a growth control initiative, even though the project fell within an exemption in the initiative and county officials failed to even consider such exemption, and where the county’s action in stopping the project constituted an unreasonable change from the County’s prior representations made to the property owner. Continue Reading County’s Unreasonable Change In Position To Stop Project Results In $1 Million Temporary Takings Award.

By William W. Abbott

Orange Citizens for Parks and Recreation v. The Superior Court of Orange County (July 10, 2013, G047013) ___ Cal.App.4th ___.

While not exactly a Dan Brown novel, the most recent planning law case illustrates the resulting agony which follows imprecise record keeping as to the status of previously adopted planning and regulatory documents, and how they fit in with updated general plans and other land use requirements. Without retracing all the subtle nuanced facts, this case starts with the adoption of the 1973 Orange Park Acres Specific Plan. When the City Council adopted the plan, it included amendments as recommended by the Planning Commission, nearly 40 years later, it was not clear as to what exactly those amendments were, a matter of some consequence in a later land use dispute. Over time, the City dropped the word “specific” from the plan document. The Orange Park plan was amended in later years, and was incorporated in the local general plan in 1989 and again in 2010 in the updated general plan. The descriptions of the planning document, and well as reference to the applicable land use standards varied overtime. As planners, developers, commissioners and elected officials come and go, an inconsistent understanding of the document over time is hardly surprising.Continue Reading Now You See It, Now You Don’t: The Mystery Of The Orange Park Acres Specific Plan.

By William W. Abbott

Save Panoche Valley v. San Benito County (June 25, 2013, H037599) ___ Cal.App.4th ___.

Famous for its bird sitings (http://www.audublog.org/?p=4155), Panoche Valley sits nestled between Interstate 5 and Highway 101 (http://www.cosb.us/Solargen/). I wager that few Californians have passed through this quiet terrain, and but for this court decision, would not know that this valley exists. Besides its limited number of residents and great diversity in bird species, Panoche Valley is also notable in that (1) it is exposed to high levels of solar radiation, and (2) it is bisected by a 230 kV transmission line. Just as no-good-deed-goes-unpunished, neither do conflicting environmental values resolve themselves without a CEQA lawsuit.Continue Reading Williamson Act Contract Cancellation For Solar Project Upheld Along With Companion Environmental Impact Report

By Glen C. Hansen

For nearly twenty years, Fifth Amendment takings challenges to adjudicative land-use exactions and permit conditions have been governed by the dual Supreme Court cases of Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987),and Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994). In Nollan, the Court held that a government could, without paying the compensation, demand the easement as a condition for granting a development permit the government was entitled to deny, provided that the exaction would substantially advance the same government interest that would furnish a valid ground for denial of the permit. The Court further refined that requirement in Dolan, holding that an adjudicative exaction requiring dedication of private property must also be “‘roughly proportional’ . . . both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development.” However, Nollan and Dolan involved the dedication of real property interests. In Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District, ___ U.S. ___, 2013 U.S. Lexis 4918 (2013), the Court held in a 5-4 decision that “the government’s demand for property from a land-use permit applicant must satisfy the requirements of Nollan and Dolan even when the government denies the permit and even when its demand is for money.” Continue Reading The U.S. Supreme Court’s Nollan/Dolan Jurisprudence Is Catching Up With The California Supreme Court in Ehrlich v. Culver City