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By Glen Hansen

In Hauselt v. County of Butte (March 23, 2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 550, the California Court of Appeal for the Third District reaffirmed the rule established in Locklin v. City of Lafayette (1994) 7 Cal.4th 327, that the rule of reasonableness, and not the rule of strict liability, applies to an inverse condemnation action involving a flood control project. Hauselt applied the reasonableness rule despite the plaintiff’s argument that the government agency activities converted the watercourse into a public work.
Continue Reading The Rule of Reasonableness Applies to Public Agency Liability for Flood Control Projects, Even if the Watercourse has Been Converted into a Public Work

By Leslie Walker

In California Oak Foundation v. County of Tehama et al. 2009 Cal. App. LEXIS 923, the California Oak Foundation (“COF”) challenged Tehama County Board of Supervisors’ (the “County”) approval of the Sun City Tehama Specific Plan and EIR. The Sun City Tehama Specific Plan is a 3,320 acre residential and commercial development adjacent to Interstate Highway 5 between Red Bluff and Redding. In an unpublished portion of the opinion, the Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District addressed COF’s claims that the EIR inadequately mitigated for the project’s impacts to Blue Oak Woodlands and traffic. In the published portion of the opinion, the Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of COF’s motion to include privileged documents in the administrative record.
Continue Reading Common Interest Doctrine Applies to County’s Disclosure to Real Parties in Interest

By Cori Badgley

In Health First v. March Joint Powers Authority (2009) (Case No. E045541), the Court of Appeal for the Fourth Appellate District addressed the issue of whether the approval of a Design Plan Application was discretionary, thus requiring review pursuant to CEQA. The court held that approval of the Design Plan Application was ministerial, not discretionary, and therefore, CEQA did not apply.
Continue Reading Approval of Design Plan Application Deemed “Ministerial” Under CEQA

By Leslie Z Walker

In Ste. Marie v. Riverside County Regional Park and Open Space District (2009) 46 Cal.4th 282, the Supreme Court resolved an apparent conflict between Public Resources Code sections 5540 and 5565 in favor of a park district’s ability to hold real property without dedicating it to park or open space purposes.
Continue Reading Land Held by Park District Not Automatically Dedicated

By Glen Hansen

In Venturi & Company LLC v. Pacific Malibu Development Corporation (April 10, 2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1417, the California Court of Appeal for the Second Appellate District held that a trial court erred in granting summary judgment and entirely dismissing a plaintiff’s claim for payment for services rendered to a development company because the plaintiff was not licensed as a real estate broker. Plaintiff may be able to recover some payment since a portion of the services provided by plaintiff were not exclusively those of a real estate broker. But the dispute could have been avoided if plaintiff had properly been licensed as a real estate broker.
Continue Reading If You Want to Act Like a Real Estate Broker, and Want to be Paid Like One, Then You Better be One

 By Katherine J. Hart

The most recent CEQA/land use decision comes from the Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District and provides important guidance on issues of exhaustion of administrative remedies, CEQA mitigation measures, and general plan interpretation. In California Native Plant Society v. City of Rancho Cordova and Jaeger Road 530, LLC, filed March

Katherine J. Hart, associate at Abbott & Kindermann, LLP will be speaking on the following topic:

Mitigation and Conservation Easements: An Overview of When and Why Mitigation is Required and How to Effectively Utilize Conservation Easements to Meet Mitigation Requirements

Location:

  • The Firehouse Restaurant – Golden Eagle Room
  • 112 Second Street ,Old Sacramento, California

By Cori Badgley

In 2008, the California Supreme Court held that the proper standard of review in deciding whether assessments imposed by local agencies violate Article XIII D of the California Constitution is de novo. (Silicon Valley Taxpayers’ Association, Inc. v. Santa Clara County Open Space Authority (2008) 44 Cal.4th 431 (“SVTA”); see California Supreme Court Rules Open Space Assessment is Invalid Special Tax Under Proposition 218.) The Court also held that the local agency has the burden of proof. (Id.) In light of the holding in SVTA, the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District reevaluated its decision to uphold the creation of a special assessment district by the City of Pomona. Although the court applied the de novo standard of review instead of substantial evidence, the court still found that the assessments imposed by the City of Pomona through the creation of the Downtown Pomona Property and Business Improvement District (“PBID”) did not violate Article XIII D of the California Constitution.
Continue Reading The Golden Rule of Assessments: The Levy Cannot Exceed Reasonable Cost of Proportional Special Benefit

By Glen Hansen

On February 3, 2009, the State Water Resources Control Board adopted its long-awaited Recycled Water Policy. The new policy is intended to support the Water Board’s strategic plan to increase sustainable local water supplies. The purpose of the new policy is to increase the beneficial use of recycled water from municipal wastewater sources in a manner that fully implements state and federal water quality laws. Pursuant to Water Code sections 13550 et seq., the Water Board declared: “[I]t is a waste and unreasonable use of water for water agencies not to use recycled water when recycled water of adequate quality is available and is not being put to beneficial use…”Continue Reading State Water Board Issues New Recycled Water Policy

By Cori Badgley

In Hofman Ranch v. Yuba County Local Agency Formation Commission, 172 Cal.App.4th 805 (2009), the Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District held that an independent contractor hired by the Local Agency Formation Commission (“LAFCo”) acting as LAFCo’s executive officer, was, for the purpose of the Brown Act, an employee of LAFCo. Because the independent contractor was an employee, LAFCo lawfully held a closed session to discuss the contractor’s employment terms pursuant to the Ralph M. Brown Act.
Continue Reading “Independent Contractor” Still Considered “Public Employee” Under the Brown Act